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Abstract
The Arctic Environmental Responsibility Index (AERI) covers 120 oil, gas, and mining
companies involved in resource extraction north of the Arctic Circle in Alaska,
Canada, Greenland, Finland, Norway, Russia, and Sweden. It is based on an interna-
tional expert perception survey among 173 members of the International Panel on
Arctic Environmental Responsibility (IPAER), whose input is processed using seg-
mented string relative ranking (SSRR) methodology. Equinor, Total, Aker BP, Con-
ocoPhillips, and BP are seen as the most environmentally responsible companies,
whereas Dalmorneftegeophysica, Zarubejneft, ERIELL, First Ore-Mining Company,
and Stroygaz Consulting are seen as the least environmentally responsible. Compa-
nies operating in Alaska have the highest average rank, whereas those operating in
Russia have the lowest average rank. Larger companies tend to rank higher than
smaller companies, state-controlled companies rank higher than privately controlled
companies, and oil and gas companies higher than mining companies. The creation of
AERI demonstrates that SSRR is a low-cost way to overcome the challenge of
indexing environmental performance and contributing to environmental governance
across disparate industrial sectors and states with divergent environmental standards
and legal and political systems.
K E YWORD S
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1 | INTRODUCTION
This article introduces the Arctic Environmental Responsibility Index
(AERI) (see Table 1). The debates in the literature on similar rankings
revolve mainly around the reliability of different methodological
approaches (Maestas, 2016; Marquardt & Pemstein, 2018; Tofallis,
2014; Urueña, 2015) and the ability of such rankings to affect gover-
nance (Bullock, 2017; Prakash & Potoski, 2012; Shvarts et al., 2018).
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This article deals with both issues but focuses on the former, provid-
ing a detailed description of the methodology and assessing the
choices made in developing AERI.
Two critical methodological choices are made: the first is the use
of expert perceptions to form the input for the ranking; the second is
the use of the segmented string relative ranking (SSRR) technique to
analyze the data. These approaches are combined in an effort to over-
come known issues in the development of rankings, and the lessons
learned from this experience can inform the development of similar
rankings in the future, as well as provide insights into the relationship
between ranking methods and the results that they produce, and by
extension their influence.
The next section establishes the conceptual and contextual back-
ground for this exercise and reflects on the governance effects of
such a ranking. Section 3 provides a detailed discussion of the meth-
odology, and Section 4 presents the ranking results. Section 5 summa-
rizes the key findings and lessons learned and reflects on possible
applications of the ranking.
2 | RANKINGS AS A GOVERNANCE TOOL
Rankings can contribute to better governance of industrial activities
by establishing norms, enhancing transparency, crediting high achieve-
ments, and discrediting poor practices (Amato & Amato, 2012;
Broome & Quirk, 2015; Bullock, 2017; Cooley & Snyder, 2015;
Shvarts et al., 2016; Towns & Rumelili, 2017; Urueña, 2015;
Walker et al., 2013). They can contribute to governance through
comparison, gamification, naming and shaming, and norm formation,
but without formal rules and the exercise of governmental power.
They can thus help improve practice without the red tape, corrup-
tion, or other risks commonly associated with environmental regula-
tion by governments (Al-Najjar & Anfimiadou, 2012; Ghosal, 2015;
Glachant, Schucht, Bültmann, & Wätzold, 2002; Heras-Saizarbitoria,
Arana, & Boiral, 2016). The governance perspective has been
applied to rankings at multiple levels, including rankings of coun-
tries (Davis, Fisher, Benedict, & Merry, 2012), universities (Fee,
Hadlock, & Pierce, 2005; Osterloh, 2010; Siganos, 2008), and inter-
national development (Best, 2017; Honig & Weaver, 2019; Kelley &
Simmons, 2019).
Rankings can contribute to environmental governance by engen-
dering a “race to the top.” A ranking such as AERI may function as an
informal governance mechanism, influencing behavior not with rules
or condemnation but rather through gamification: a competition in
which some companies are more successful and others less so
(Boer, 2003; Prakash, 2001). The more units a ranking covers, the
greater competition it can potentially trigger. The SSRR method
makes it possible to deal with highly disparate units and thus cover
more units in one ranking (see Section 3.2). Companies are free to
ignore a ranking, but it may still serve as a mechanism for
establishing norms and competition (Fanasch, 2019). If a low-ranked
company is investigated by the authorities or journalists, or sued by
someone over an environmental issue, its low rank might put the
company at a disadvantage, in terms of both legal processes and pub-
lic relations. It is also theoretically possible that a company's rank may
also influence its access to capital (Prakash & Potoski, 2012; Shvarts
et al., 2016; Trumpp & Guenther, 2017). The petroleum and mining
industries may be in particular need of such rankings, as the number
of voluntary sustainability initiatives in the extractives sector grows,
while their effectiveness is increasingly being questioned and scruti-
nized (MacInnes, Colchester, & Whitmore, 2017; Potts et al., 2018;
Ranängen & Zobel, 2014).
Laws have absolute thresholds for what is counted as acceptable
and unacceptable behaviors (Shvarts et al., 2015). By contrast, the
competition generated by a ranking does not have a cutoff point. As a
society develops, most companies may come to uphold a law or stan-
dard, and thus companies are not forced to continue improving their
behavior. To achieve that, new laws must be passed, which requires
initiative, time, and dedication. By contrast, a ranking always gives
some companies higher scores and some lower, and thus it never
stops chasing them towards greater environmental responsibility.
With a ranking that is repeated at regular intervals, the sky is theoreti-
cally the limit for environmental standards. Conversely, if almost all
the companies in a ranking are not in fact environmentally friendly,
there is a risk that that relatively high ranks can be used
for greenwashing purposes (Chen & Chang, 2013; Lyon &
Montgomery, 2015; Martínez et al., 2020). It is therefore important to
be cautious about how one interprets and uses rankings.
Two examples of rankings that are seen as contributing to gover-
nance are the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of Transparency
International and the Ease of Doing Business Index (EDBI) of the
World Bank, both of which are believed to have stimulated improved
performance on the part of states (Besley, 2015; Davis, Kingsbury, &
Merry, 2012; Merry, Davis, & Kingsbury, 2015). By ranking govern-
ments according to the (perceived) level of corruption in their country,
the CPI puts pressure on corrupt governments to recognize the mag-
nitude of the problem and its reputational cost (Andersson &
Heywood, 2009; Wilhelm, 2002). Similarly, the EDBI facilitates com-
petition among states to have the best business climate.
The governance effect of rankings could be particularly beneficial
in the Arctic extractive industries. Like the Amazon rainforest, the
Arctic is a key component of the global ecosystem, and the environ-
mental health of the Arctic is therefore of global importance
(Koivurova, Molenaar, & Vanderzwaag, 2009; Storey, 2014). The area
above the Arctic Circle makes up around 20 million km2, a significant
portion of the planet's surface. It spans three continents and eight
countries and also draws the interest of many non-Arctic countries, as
indicated by their observer status in the Arctic Council (including
China, France, Germany, India, Japan, South Korea, and the United
Kingdom). Around 30% of the world's remaining undiscovered gas and
13% of undiscovered oil is located in the Arctic; and the value of cir-
cumpolar Arctic mineral reserves has been estimated at USD 1 trillion
(US Coast Guard, 2013; USGS, 2000). However, several factors—the
remoteness of the Arctic from major centers of power (Gautier
et al., 2009; Huskey, 2005), its division among eight states (Steinberg,
Tasch, Gerhardt, Keul, & Nyman, 2015), and the resistance of these
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states to the intervention of non-Arctic countries in Arctic environ-
mental management (Overland, 2010)—hinder the imposition of a uni-
fied system of environmental control in the Arctic (Chater, 2016).
The environmental responsibility rankings that have so far been
developed for the extractive industries operating in the Arctic cover
only one country and one industry, and often they cover both the
Arctic and non-Arctic parts of the country in question.1 For example,
in Russia, two environmental rankings are potentially relevant to
AERI—the Polar Index (Nikonorov et al., 2018a, 2018b) and the
World Wildlife Fund/Creon ranking of environmental responsi-
bility/transparency of oil and gas companies in Russia (Knizhnikov
et al., 2017; Knizhnikov et al., 2018, 2019; Shvarts et al., 2016;
Shvarts et al., 2018; WWF/Creon, 2014). There appears to be greater
interest in extractive company rankings in Russia than in other Arctic
countries. This may be because state-led and law-based governance is
seen as less reliable in Russia. It may be for the same reason that the
literature on rating systems for companies in developing countries is
rich (Garcia et al., 2007; Hilson, 2012; Lodhia & Hess, 2014; Powers
et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2004).
In the other Arctic states than Russia, it is harder to find such
rankings, although other voluntary corporate responsibility frame-
works do exist for extractive industry companies. The Mining Associ-
ation of Canada has developed the Towards Sustainable Mining
(TSM) initiative for Canadian companies. TSM has also been adopted
by the Finnish Network for Sustainable Mining and the Norwegian
mining association, Norsk Bergindustri.2 The TSM Protocols include
evaluation criteria resulting in ratings from C to triple A (following
the logic of credit ratings), but these are not used to create rankings
of companies. At the global level, there are initiatives such as the
Global Compact, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), Integrated
Reporting, the Equitable Origin responsible energy standard, the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 14001 environ-
mental management standard, the European Union Eco-Management
and Audit Scheme (EMAS) certification, the Initiative for Responsible
Mining Assurance (IRMA) standard, and the International Council on
Mining and Metals (ICMM) Principles for Sustainable Development
(see Roca & Searcy, 2012; Searcy & Elkhawas, 2012; Wagner, 2020).
All of these serve to stimulate greater transparency and more
responsible business practices, but they do not trigger direct com-
parison and competition among companies in the same way as a
ranking does (Moran et al., 2014; Raufflet, Cruz, & Bres, 2014; Yadav
et al., 2017).
In the context of Arctic resource extraction, a proper ranking
focusing on environmental responsibility and spanning the whole cir-
cumpolar north and the major extractive industries is something
new. The more industries and companies it covers, the greater the
chance that such a ranking can help fill the governance gap by geo-
graphically widening and ramping up environmental competition
among extractive companies. The purpose of this article is thus to
create AERI, spanning the oil, gas, and mining industries and the
entire Arctic. In doing so, we also seek to demonstrate how it is
methodologically possible to create an index covering disparate
countries and sectors at a low cost. If a unitary index can be made
to cost-efficiently apply across the Arctic states and extractive
industries, the same approach can be applied to other seemingly
incongruent regions and sectors.
The aim of making AERI as broad as possible leads to some meth-
odological challenges, which are dealt with in the next section, includ-
ing how experts were recruited; how their input was processed; and
how the companies to be included in the ranking were selected.
3 | METHODOLOGY
For the same reasons that a broad index can be useful for governance
purposes, it is tricky: the different Arctic countries have different legal
frameworks; environmental standards vary among the countries and
sectors; and environmental issues vary from sector to sector and in
different locations. For example, virtually all mining projects are
located onshore, whereas oil and gas developments might be onshore
or offshore, and they might require the construction of extended
pipeline systems. The types of environmental risks and accidents they
involve are different. Because of such differences, it is difficult to for-
mulate objective, fact-based criteria that are meaningful across the
companies extracting different types of resources in different parts of
the Arctic. The alternative approach of asking companies to self-
report is unreliable. And carrying out detailed fieldwork at all company
sites would be prohibitively expensive.
To get around these challenges, two important elements were
incorporated into AERI: it is based on an expert perceptions survey,
and the expert input is processed using the innovative SSRR method-
ology. The basis for these methodological choices and their implica-
tions is discussed in the next two subsections.
3.1 | Perceptions as a basis for a ranking
Choosing an expert perceptions survey design made it possible to
cover more companies spread over a greater geographical area than
would have been possible if one were to inspect them individually. An
important aspect of the AERI expert perceptions survey was the
selection of the experts and ensuring that their perceptions were
grounded in appropriate experience and expertise (see Section 3.6).
Perceptions surveys involve a risk of subjectivity. However, the
alternative methods for gathering information for rankings—including
company self-reporting and review of other publicly available
information—are not necessarily more objective or indeed sufficiently
comprehensive in their coverage of “environmental responsibility.”
Published pollution figures and self-reporting of environmental con-
flicts alone cannot provide the full picture of environmental responsi-
bility, which refers to a company's efforts to avoid harm to the natural
environment and the livelihoods of local and indigenous peoples (see
1The ranking produced by Overland (2016) covers mining and oil and gas companies in all
Arctic countries but focuses solely on those companies' policies on indigenous rights.
2In addition to Finland and Norway, TSM has also been adopted as a national-level
framework in Argentina, Botswana, the Philippines, and Spain.
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Section 3.5). Experts were recruited for the survey with many years of
Arctic experience, including working within companies, being mem-
bers of communities affected by company activity, or carrying out
extensive field work in companies' regions of operations. Although
data provided by these experts are always going to be subjective, they
are nonetheless rich and valuable data that should not be dismissed
lightly, especially given the lack of entirely objective or comprehensive
data available from other sources.
Although perceptions inevitably involve an element of subjectiv-
ity, they can be useful, especially as far as the governance effect of a
ranking is concerned. The CPI of Transparency International,
discussed above, is an expert perceptions index (albeit one employing
a different method to AERI), rather than a precise empirical measure-
ment of the level of corruption in different countries—which would
be impossible to achieve (Beddow, 2015; Lambsdorff, 2006;
Treisman, 2007). Nonetheless, the CPI provides useful information
for citizens, governments, and companies and has a powerful effect
on the reputations of states (Serenko & Bontis, 2018; Steenbergen &
Marks, 2007). Such surveys can be replicated, and if similar respon-
dents are used, the surveys are likely to yield similar results. If prop-
erly executed, they can be informative and effective. In addition to
the selection of experts, critical to the success of a perceptions sur-
vey approach is the form in which the input is provided and the way
that it is subsequently analyzed. These are discussed in the next
sections.
3.2 | Segmented string relative ranking
The SSRR methodology was first developed in Overland (2018), and
an open-source computer-based algorithm was later developed by
Overland and Juraev (2019), making it easier to apply to real-world
cases. Using SSRR methodology to process the expert input for AERI
makes it possible to cover diverse companies. This is because the
SSRR methodology avoids the use of grades and uses only relativistic
input. That is to say, experts rank those companies with which they
are familiar in relation to each other, rather than ascribing absolute
grades to them. As there are no grades or criteria, the SSRR methodol-
ogy is versatile and can be applied to disparate units for which it
would be difficult to develop uniform criteria—such as oil and mining
companies, or companies operating under, for instance, the American
and Finnish legal systems.
This also gives SSRR additional advantages over other expert-
based ranking methodologies. Most expert-based rankings depend
on experts giving items grades (Maestas, 2016). However, there is
always a risk that some experts will be stricter than others in the
application of grades (Marquardt & Pemstein, 2018). Differences in
grading practices are particularly salient when different groups of
units are graded by different experts (Tofallis, 2014). For example,
if one expert assesses companies operating in Canada and another
expert assesses companies operating in Russia, there is a risk that
grades will be applied differently to companies operating in those
two countries.
To limit this problem, detailed criteria can be developed for each
grade. However, consistent grading is still not guaranteed. For exam-
ple, the mining and metals company Teck, based in Canada and oper-
ating in Alaska, has scored highly in rankings such as in
Overland (2016), which assessed companies' publicly reported formal
mechanisms and institutional arrangements for indigenous rights pro-
tection. However, the company has been embroiled in environmental
and indigenous rights conflicts and has been the target of lawsuits by
indigenous groups. Notwithstanding the extensive work on formal
criteria and gathering of data on Teck by Overland (2016), these
weaknesses were not captured when the company was assessed.
Similar problems apply to the Polar Index in Russia (Nikonorov
et al., 2018a), which places Lukoil as the number one company for
sustainability performance, despite the fact that its subsidiary, Lukoil-
Komi, has been responsible for extensive and repeated oil pollution
incidents in Russia's Komi Republic, resulting in widespread local pro-
tests (Loginova & Wilson, 2020; Stuvøy, 2011). By contrast, in AERI,
Teck comes 60th out of 120 companies, whereas Lukoil comes in
37th place, below five other Russian companies (seeTable 1).
Another problem with many criteria-based rankings is that many
companies can get the same score and therefore have to be bunched
together into groups. This makes rankings more ambivalent and diffi-
cult to communicate clearly to the public, which can in turn weaken
their governance effect. Accordingly, another advantage of SSRR is
that its strictly hierarchical approach ensures that every company has
its own exclusive place in the ranking.
Finally, with a criteria-based approach, fewer companies can be
compared, as few criteria apply across sectors and countries have dif-
ferent rules and regulations and gather different types of statistics.
Again, a reduction in the number of companies covered would
weaken the ranking's governance impact (Sharkey & Bromley, 2015).
By contrast, in order to maximize the relevance of AERI, it was desir-
able to make it as broad as possible, for which SSRR is particularly
suited. For more information about SSRR, see the computer code for
the SSRR algorithm and a flowchart presentation of it in
Appendices A, B, C, and D and a detailed technical discussion of its
operation in Overland & Juraev (2019).
3.3 | Processing expert input
The experts providing input for AERI ranked only those companies
they were familiar with, and only in relation to each other. Accord-
ingly, their input came in the form: Company X is better than
Company Y, which is better than Company Z. This input makes up a
segment, and all the segments received from different experts were
joined together into one long string, which constitutes the ranking.
The result is a “pure” ranking that starts with ranking input and ends
with a ranking, rather than starting with criteria, giving grades, and
finally translating the grades into a ranking.
The experts were requested to rank companies they were familiar
with, according to their perceptions of that company's environmental
responsibility, based on their own experience and expertise. The
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TABLE 1 The AERI ranking
Rank Company Countrya Rank Company Country
1 Equinor NO 61 Marine Arctic Geol. Exp. RU
2 Total NO 62 Hilcorp US
3 Aker BP NO 63 Fortis Petroleum Corp. NO
4 ConocoPhillips US 64 Lime Petroleum NO
5 BP US 65 Auryn Resources CA
6 Exxon Mobil US 66 Nunaoil DK
7 ENI US 67 Norge Mineral Resources NO
8 Anglo American FI 68 Kovdorsky GOK RU
9 Repsol US 69 Arctic Marine Engineering-Geol. Exp. RU
10 Royal Dutch Shell US 70 Great Bear Petroleum US
11 Baffinland Iron Mines Corp. CA 71 Centrica Resources NO
12 Chevron CA 72 Nortec Minerals FI
13 Gazprom RU 73 Dragon Mining FI
14 Arctic Slope Regional C. US 74 Aurion Resources FI
15 MMG Resources CA 75 Concedo NO
16 Arctic Gold Mining NO 76 Rosneft RU
17 Elkem NO 77 Northgas RU
18 Boliden SE 78 Skaland Graphite NO
19 Novatek RU 79 Sibelco Nordic NO
20 NANA Regional Corp. US 80 Nenetskaya Neftyanaya Komp. RU
21 Atlantic Petroleum NO 81 Store Norske NO
22 Kinross Gold RU 82 Edison NO
23 LKAB SE 83 Noreco NO
24 North Energy NO 84 IronBark Zinc DK
25 Wintershall NO 85 Polymetal Int. RU
26 Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. US 86 Commander Resources CA
27 Severstal RU 87 Taranis Resources FI
28 DEA Norge NO 88 True North Gems CA
29 Sydvaranger Gruve NO 89 Tertiary Minerals FI
30 Yamal LNG RU 90 Gold Fields FI
31 Capricorn Greenland Expl. DK 91 Northern Cross Energy CA
32 Achimgaz RU 92 Vorkutaugol RU
33 Petoro NO 93 PhosAgro RU
34 Imperial Oil CA 94 Brooks Range Petroleum US
35 Agnico Eagle Mines FI 95 SK Rusvietpetro RU
36 Norwegian Rose NO 96 Caelus Energy US
37 Lukoil RU 97 Novourengoyskaya Burovaya Komp. RU
38 Norilsk Nickel RU 98 First Quantum Minerals FI
39 Doyon US 99 Magnus Minerals FI
40 Leonhard Nilsen & S. NO 100 RUSAL RU
41 Hudson Resources DK 101 Beowulf Mining SE
42 Nordic Mining NO 102 Vår energi NO
43 Lundin NO 103 Lovozerskiy GOK RU
44 Yamalzoloto RU 104 Surgutneftegas RU
45 Omya Hustadm. NO 105 CNPC RU
46 OMV NO 106 Komnedra RU
(Continues)
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ranking input/segment from each expert was fed into the algorithm,
which strung them together into AERI. To make it possible to string
together segments, they must include some common units. Figure 1
gives a simplified representation of how this works.
Inevitably, experts contradict each other—some may have had
more experience of companies' relations with indigenous peoples, and
others may have based their responses more on different companies'
waste management and resource efficiency practices. The SSRR algo-
rithm solves this problem by first calculating the interrelationships
among all companies ranked by all experts and subsequently using a
link analysis approach, similar to the Google PageRank algorithm, to
work out the contradictions. This enables the rankings of companies
in relation to each other to feed from one segment to another.
When carrying out link analysis, it is necessary to include a
damping factor to avoid scores being passed on in endless, ever-
escalating circles within the network. For AERI, sensitivity test runs
were carried out with several different damping factors, and a choice
was made to stick to the conventional damping factor of 0.85.
Different damping factors did not generate significantly different
results, and there was therefore little reason to depart from the
convention.
3.4 | Identification of companies
Envisaging an Arctic environmental responsibility index, one might,
for instance, picture an offshore oil platform of a well-known oil com-
pany somewhere in Arctic waters and assume that it is self-evident
which companies should be covered by such a ranking. However,
several definitional issues are encountered. Where, exactly, is the
Arctic and what is its outer boundary? What kind of activities qualify
a company as being an extractive company? How should subsidiaries
and joint ventures be handled? The definitions applied in this article
are the result of lengthy investigations and discussions in several
workshops involving company, nongovernmental organization (NGO),
and government staff in addition to academics.
TABLE 1 (Continued)
Rank Company Countrya Rank Company Country
47 Geo Mining NO 107 Trust Arktikugol NO
48 Bashneft RU 108 TMAC Resources CA
49 Tullow Oil NO 109 The QUARTZ Corp. NO
50 ENGIE NO 110 Almazy Anabara RU
51 Spirit Energy NO 111 North-Western Phosphorous Co. RU
52 Nussir NO 112 EMX Royalty Corporation SE
53 ALROSA RU 113 Hannukainen Mining FI
54 Bluejay Mining DK 114 Arktikmorneftegazrazvedka RU
55 Occidental Petr. US 115 Sunstone Metals SE
56 E.ON NO 116 Dalmorneftegeophysica RU
57 Platina Resources DK 117 Zarubezhneft RU
58 PGNiG NO 118 Eriellb RU
59 Greenland Resources DK 118 First Ore Mining Companyb RU
60 Teck Resources US 118 Stroygaz Consultingb RU
Country codes: CA, Canada; DK, Denmark; FI, Finland; NO, Norway; RU, Russia; SE, Sweden; US, United States.
Abbreviation: AERI, Arctic Environmental Responsibility Index.
aCountries listed here are the main countries where companies have operations. Companies may also operate in other Arctic countries and may have their
main base outside the Arctic.
bThe three last companies are italicized because they share one rank.
F IGURE 1 How input from different experts is combined into one ranking
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In order to be included in the ranking, a company had to be
involved in oil, gas, or mining activities above the Arctic Circle, regard-
less of where its headquarters are located. Some Canadians find this
definition unjust, as there is much mining activity in Canada in areas
with Arctic climatic conditions but located south of the Arctic Circle.
However, the advantage of this choice is that it greatly eases the sur-
prisingly difficult task of differentiating between Arctic and non-Arctic
companies: one determines the locations of a company's operations,
checks the geographic coordinates of those locations, and ascertains
whether they are above or below the Arctic Circle. The location of the
Arctic Circle is a fact no one disputes. Any other definition of the
Arctic—and there are many—is more open to contention. It is
important to note that, by extension of this methodological choice,
we classify companies according to the Arctic country in which they
operate, not where their global headquarters, owners, or non-Arctic
operations are located.
A company's Arctic operations could be in exploration or extrac-
tion, and it could have operative responsibility or be a subcontractor
or supplier of materials, equipment, or services. But it had to have its
own website, not just a Facebook page or an entry in a Bloomberg
database, as is the case for some small companies.
Subsidiaries were treated as a part of their parent companies
rather than as separate entities. For example, Gazprom Dobycha
Nadym was considered the same as Gazprom, and ConocoPhillips
Canada as ConocoPhillips. However, as joint ventures have multiple
parent companies, they were treated as separate companies. The
most prominent case was Yamal LNG, a joint venture involving
Russian Novatek, FrenchTotal, the Chinese Silk Road Fund, and China
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), with a total value of over
USD 20 billion (Praym Raskrytie, 2019). Another was Aker BP, which
is a major oil company in its own right with its own history, although
its largest shareholders are Aker and BP.
3.5 | Environmental responsibility
In the context of AERI, “environmental responsibility” is defined as
seeking to avoid harm to the Arctic environment and the culture and
livelihoods of Arctic peoples. Table 2 adds further detail to this defini-
tion. These points apply specifically to the activities of companies in
the Arctic, not what companies do in other parts of the world.
As the focus of this study is the environmental aspects of
upstream resource extraction specifically located in the Arctic, green-
house gas emissions that will affect the Arctic indirectly via climate
change are not covered by the ranking.
3.6 | Recruitment of experts for survey
Input was received from 173 experts. In order to encourage them to
contribute, the International Panel on Arctic Environmental
Responsibility (IPAER) was set up as a freestanding and independent
international body (IPAER, 2018). Experts were then recruited as
IPAER members. This meant that their contribution was formalized
and given status. The aim was to make it more attractive for compe-
tent, busy experts to contribute to the ranking. Motivating respon-
dents to contribute is one of the main challenges when carrying out
surveys, and this approach might be useful for other surveys too.
The recruitment of experts was laborious. Background checks
were carried out, and some experts were also interviewed by tele-
phone or email. This is one reason why this article has multiple coau-
thors, as the recruitment and engagement work was divided among
several people familiar with different extractive industries and Arctic
areas.
The aim was not to select a statistically representative sample of
respondents but rather to select the most relevant and competent
people. As all segments of expert input had to be connected with each
other directly or indirectly for the SSRR algorithm to function, it was
particularly important to recruit experts who were familiar with more
than one Arctic country or extractive industry sector and could help
link together the input on those countries or sectors.
On the one hand, the greater the number of experts, the more
solid the survey. On the other hand, the stricter the selection of
experts, the higher the quality of their input and thus the survey. It
was therefore necessary to balance quantity and quality in the
selection of experts. The experts were drawn from all seven Arctic
states and included people with relevant expertise from another
TABLE 2 Definition of environmental responsibility
Aspect Details
Damage Minimizing damage to Arctic ecosystems (marine,
freshwater, and terrestrial).
Species Avoiding endangering Arctic species, both fauna
and flora.
Toxins Minimizing the release of toxic substances to the
air, water, and soil.
Accidents Minimizing the risk of accidents that could harm
the environment.
Cleanup Cleaning up any environmental damage.
Subcontractors Ensuring that subcontractors behave in an
environmentally responsible way.
Consent Ensuring FPIC of local people.
Indigenous
peoples
Avoiding disrupting the lives and livelihoods of
Arctic indigenous peoples.
Legislation Upholding national environmental laws and
international legal instruments and guidelines.
Transparency Transparency about industrial activities and
environmental damage.
Reporting Publishing annual environmental reports certified
by a public or professional auditor.
Standards Environmental reporting compliant with GRI
guidelines and ISO 14001 environmental
management certification.
Abbreviations: FPIC, free, prior, and informed consent; GRI, Global
Reporting Initiative.
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10 non-Arctic countries. This geographical spread of experts made it
possible to cover companies operating in all Arctic states (see
Figure 2A). A balance was sought between female and male respon-
dents, and a ratio of 40% female and 60% male experts was achieved
(see Figure 2B).
To ensure multifaceted input, people were recruited from a
variety of backgrounds, including academics, journalists, consultants,
government officials, employees of NGOs, indigenous representatives,
and residents of regions where the oil and gas or mining industries
operate. The largest group of experts recruited was academics, mainly
because more in-depth information about them was publicly available,
making it easier to ascertain their competence, and partly because
they were more likely to be neutral than, for example, company or
community representatives. Some government officials and company
staff declined to contribute to the index because they felt that it
would not be appropriate for someone in their position.
The experts committed to acting impartially and disclosing any
conflicts of interest. Their input was anonymized so that it would not
be possible to trace it back to individual respondents.
4 | RESULTS
The final ranking is presented in Table 1. The three highest ranked
companies are Western companies operating in Norway. However,
companies operating in the United States (Alaska) had the highest
average rank. The bottom of the ranking is dominated by compa-
nies operating in Russia. Overall, large companies are ranked higher
than small companies; state-controlled companies are ranked higher
than private companies; and oil and gas companies are ranked
higher than mining companies. The results are discussed in further
detail below.
The bottom three companies in the ranking—marked with italics—
could not be ranked in relation to each other as there are no compa-
nies below them for the algorithm to feed off. They were left that
way in order to keep the ranking methodology consistent. Another
seven companies could not be included in the ranking at all because
none of the experts had an opinion about them. These are listed in
Appendix D.
4.1 | Large versus small companies
Many large companies do well in AERI, which corresponds with the
findings of other researchers (e.g., Lee, 2015; Shvarts et al., 2016). For
a company with a turnover of billions of dollars, the cost of having
staff with competence on environmental and social issues and control
systems for avoiding environmental damage and conflict may not be
that high per dollar of revenue, whereas for a smaller company with a
smaller income, the relative cost may be considerably higher
(Blowfield & Murray, 2011; Lyons et al., 2016). Larger, more
established companies are likely to have a greater interest in
protecting their reputation, brand name, and market position;, and
they may be under greater scrutiny from civil society, the media, and
their shareholders and investors (Franks, 2015; Frynas, 2009). Larger
companies also have more resources for self-promotion. Smaller and
newer companies may have less confidence in future earnings and
less of a brand name to protect, as well as an ability to operate below
the radar of civil society and less resources for self-promotion. Thus,
on the one hand, the fact that larger companies have higher positions
in the ranking might indicate a possible bias in favor of individual large
companies on the part of the experts (e.g., because they are better
known). On the other hand, it can also be interpreted as indicating
that the structural characteristics of large companies give them stron-
ger incentives and capacities than small companies for sound environ-
mental management, and therefore, it is possible that the perceptions
of the experts adequately reflect reality on the ground.
4.2 | Highest and lowest ranked companies by
sector and by country
Based on the complete ranking in Table 1, the perceived five best and
five worst performing companies were identified in the oil and gas
sector and in the mining sector, respectively (see Table 3). The three
best and worst performing companies in each Arctic country were
also identified (see Table 4). Equinor, Total, Aker BP, ConocoPhillips,
and BP are seen as the most environmentally responsible extractive
companies working in the Arctic, whereas Dalmorneftegeophysica,
Eriell, First Ore Mining Company, Stroygaz Consulting, and
F IGURE 2 Composition of experts
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Zarubezhneft are seen as the least environmentally responsible. There
are fewer mining companies than oil and gas companies at the top of
the table. The top three companies are operating in Norway, whereas
the companies ranked 4–6 are operating in the United States (Alaska).
Although companies operating in Russia dominate the lower ranks—
the bottom five all operate in Russia—low-ranking companies (ranked
between 100 and 118) are also operating in Canada, Finland, Norway,
and Sweden.
4.3 | Average ranks by sector, ownership, and
country
The average ranks of different categories of company were compared
according to sector and country, and according to whether they were
state controlled or private companies. The boxplots in Figures 3–5
show the mean rank, median rank, and quartiles of each category of
company.
Figure 3 shows that oil and gas companies have higher average
ranks than mining companies. This finding is similar to that of
Overland (2016), who found that oil and gas companies performed
better than mining companies on indigenous rights in the Arctic. Out
of the 10 top-ranked companies, there is only one mining company:
TABLE 3 Highest and lowest ranked oil and gas and mining companies (numbers represent rankings)
Oil and gas companies Mining companies
1 Equinor (NO) 8 Anglo American (FI)
2 Total (NO) 11 Baffinland Iron Mines Corporation (CA)
Top 5 3 Aker BP (NO) 15 MMG Resources (CA)
4 ConocoPhillips (US) 16 Arctic Gold Mining (NO)
5 BP (US) 17 Elkem (NO)
114 Arktikmorneftegazrazvedka (RU) 111 North-Western Phosphorous Co. (RU)
116 Dalmorneftegeophysica (RU) 112 EMX Royalty Corporation (SE)
Bottom 5 117 Zarubezhneft (RU) 113 Hannukainen Mining (FI)
118 Eriell (RU) 115 Sunstone Metals (SE)
118 Stroygaz Consulting (RU) 118 First Ore Mining Company (RU)
TABLE 4 Highest and lowest ranked companies by country of operation (numbers represent rankings)
Canada Denmark Finland Norway
11 Baffinland Iron Mines 31 Capricorn Greenl. Expl. 8 Anglo American 1 Equinor
Top 3 12 Chevron 41 Hudson Resources 35 Agnico Eagle Mines 2 Total
15 MMG Resources 54 Bluejay Mining 72 Nortec Minerals 3 Aker BP
88 True North Gems 59 Greenland Resources 98 First Quantum Min. 102 Vår Energi
Bottom 3 91 Northern Cross Energy 66 Nunaoil 99 Magnus Minerals 107 Trust Arktikugol
108 TMAC Resources 84 IronBark Zinc 113 Hannukainen Mining 109 The QUARTZ Corp.
Russia Sweden United States
13 Gazprom 18 Boliden 4 ConocoPhillips
Top 3 19 Kinross Gold 23 LKAB 5 BP
22 Novatek 101 Beowulf Mininga 6 Exxon Mobil
118 Eriell 101 Beowulf Mininga 70 Great Bear Petrol.
Bottom 3 119 First Ore Mining 112 EMX Royalty Corp. 94 Brooks Range Petr.
120 Stroygaz Consulting 115 Sunstone Metals 96 Caelus Energy
aAERI includes only five companies operating in Sweden, so Beowulf Mining is included both among the top 3 and the bottom 3.
F IGURE 3 Average rank of oil and gas versus mining companies
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Anglo American, ranked eighth. Similarly, in a ranking of the quality of
sustainability reporting by Vormedal and Ruud (2009), oil and gas
companies achieved higher average scores than those from other
sectors.
A possible reason for the higher ranks of oil and gas companies is
that they have higher public profiles and better known brands and are
therefore forced to be more conscious about environmental protec-
tion. This explanation fits with Rahman et al.'s (2020) finding that
firms that perform better environmentally take larger market shares.
Consumers choose among gas stations representing different oil com-
panies, subjecting the companies to pressure over their environmental
performance. By contrast, the products of mining companies are
incorporated into other goods before they are sold to consumers,
reducing consumer attention to mining companies. Few consumers
know who supplied the steel for their car or the minerals used in their
mobile phone. However, the growing popularity of Fairphones (with
recycled and sustainably sourced components) and the increase in
mineral-related voluntary sustainability initiatives, including Fairtrade
Gold, the Aluminum Stewardship Initiative, the Fair Cobalt Alliance,
and IRMA, suggest that sustainable sourcing of minerals is becoming
increasingly important (Potts et al., 2018).
The higher rank of oil companies could also be related to the fact
that mining operations are onshore and are more likely to have a
direct impact on land and communities, whereas many oil and gas
company operations are offshore. Further research would be needed
to determine the reason for this disparity in perceptions of perfor-
mance between mining and oil and gas companies.
Figure 4 shows that state-controlled companies have a higher
average rank than privately controlled companies. For the purposes of
this ranking, “state-controlled” is defined as companies where a
majority of the shares are controlled by the state. The average rank of
state-controlled companies in the ranking is pulled upwards by the
ranks of Equinor (1) and Gazprom (13). However, both of these
companies are partially privatized and actively traded on stock
exchanges, which means that they actually confirm the rule.
Figure 5 shows that companies operating in the United States
(that is to say, Alaska) have the highest average rank, followed by
countries operating in Norway, Denmark (Greenland), Canada,
Sweden, Finland, and Russia—in that order. Thus, although Thurner
and Proskuryakova (2014) found already in 2014 that Russian compa-
nies were paying more attention to environmental protection than
they did previously, their mean ranks in AERI indicate that they are
still lagging behind their Western peers. However, if one looks at the
median rather than mean rank, companies operating in Sweden come
out the lowest, whereas Russian companies come out better than
both their Finnish and Swedish peers. Using the mean ensures that all
values are taken into account, whereas the median reduces sensitivity
to broad data ranges and outliers.
At the 13th place, Gazprom came out significantly better than
most of its Russian peers. This contrasts with the WWF/Creon rank-
ing of environmental transparency of oil and gas companies, which
ranks Gazprom sixth out of 22 Russian companies in 2018 and 10th
out of 20 companies in 2019 (Knizhnikov et al., 2018, 2019). The
WWF/Creon ranking also lists Zarubezhneft second in both 2018 and
2019, whereas the same company comes in at No. 117 in AERI. The
AERI results may reflect a pro-Gazprom bias among the experts who
provided input for the ranking. However, AERI is the result of input
from both Russian and Western experts, who ranked other Russian
and non-Russian companies in their inputs. Among those experts who
ranked both Gazprom and other Russian companies, Gazprom was
quite consistently ranked above its Russian peers, whereas those who
ranked Zarubezhneft consistently ranked it below its Russian peers. It
is therefore also possible that the disparity between the results of
AERI and the WWF/Creon ranking reflects the difference between
measuring environmental transparency through publicly available
materials and perceiving environmental performance through the eyes
of a diverse range of experts. However, this is a question for further
research and debate.
Regarding countries of operations, Figure 5 can be compared with
the results of the 2017 Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG)
survey of corporate social responsibility disclosure and reporting prac-
tices among the 100 largest companies in each of 49 countries where
the companies have offices (KPMG, 2017). If one looks up the Arctic
countries in the KPMG survey, one finds that companies based in
Denmark rank the highest, followed by the United States, Norway,
Sweden, Canada, Finland, and Russia. Thus, whereas there are some
differences between KPMG's results and AERI, the similarity is nota-
ble, considering that the KPMG survey covers the whole of these
countries, not just their Arctic regions, and the two rankings employ
entirely different methodologies.
F IGURE 4 Average rank of state versus private companies
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Whereas AERI yields results that are comparable with other rank-
ings (and diverges from others), the AERI methodology has arguably
proven more sensitive to issues that are not captured in formal
reporting. This can be seen in the case of Teck, the mining and metals
company based in Canada and operating in Alaska, which was ranked
No. 1 in Overland (2016)—which did not reflect its negative reputa-
tion on environmental and indigenous rights issues (see Section 3.2).
Despite extensive gathering of publicly available data, and assessment
of the data according to formal criteria, Overland (2016) did not
capture these weaknesses. By contrast, in AERI—which is based on
expert perceptions that extend beyond formal reporting—Teck comes
out as 60th out of 120 companies. Similarly, the controversial Russian
companies Lukoil and Norilsk Nickel—ranked first and third,
respectively, in the Polar Index (Nikonorov et al., 2018a)—are ranked
37th and 38th, respectively, in AERI, behind five other Russian com-
panies (seeTable 1 and Section 3.2).
5 | CONCLUSIONS
This article has provided a detailed description of the methodology used
to compile the AERI, along with an analysis of the key findings. The use
of the new SSRR method to analyze expert perceptions has helped to
avoid issues normally associated with perceptions surveys, such as the
varying strictness of contributing experts. Moreover, because it is able to
cover highly disparate units—in this case extractive industry companies
of different sizes and types, operating in diverse sectors and geographi-
cal regions of the Arctic—it is able to cover more units in one ranking.
AERI has also demonstrated how this is possible at a low cost—all of the
expert inputs were voluntary, and no additional travel was required. The
AERI approach could be applied to other contexts at a similarly low cost.
AERI is entirely relativistic. It does not imply that the environmental
performance of companies is good or bad in absolute terms; it simply
orders them in relation to each other. It is up to the reader to determine
whether to think of the top-ranked companies as “good” and the
bottom-ranked as “bad” in terms of their environmental responsibility,
or all the companies as varying degrees of good or bad. In terms of gov-
ernance, however, AERI's aim is to stimulate a desire among companies
to rise in the rankings and to perform better than their peers.
One conclusion that we can draw from this exercise is that differ-
ent ranking methodologies can yield different results. It is therefore
important to make clear the type of data a ranking is based on—for
example, by indicating that it is a perceptions survey or being clear on
whether it is a ranking of environmental responsibility or transpar-
ency. It is also useful to triangulate the results with other sources: we
found that the results of AERI are in line with other sources in many
cases. The positions of individual companies and the relative perfor-
mance of particular countries as they are reflected in the ranking will
undoubtedly be questioned, and the results will be interpreted in
various ways, but this is welcomed, given that one of the aims of the
ranking is to generate discussion and debate.
Such a ranking might be an opportunity to draw attention to
smaller, lesser known companies that are frequently overlooked, and
thus act as an incentive for them to improve their performance. It
could also spur research that critically assesses to what extent the
actual performances of larger companies support their placements in
the ranking, or to explore the reasons why oil and gas companies rank
higher than mining companies—and whether this is likely to change
over time in light of growing concern about mineral sustainability.
In its current form, AERI is thus an experiment in what could be
called “governance without enforcement.” It may trigger public
debate and dialogue, internal corporate thinking, civil society activism,
and—if repeated—an environmental race to the top among extractive
industry companies. This could reduce some of the risks associated
with relying heavily on environmental regulation by governments,
such as red tape and corruption, different legal and regulatory frame-
works, and variable environmental standards. This does not imply that
the state is seen as unimportant for environmental governance in the
Arctic. AERI is not meant to replace the governance roles of Arctic
states or multilateral institutions but to complement them and per-
haps stimulate improvements among them as well.
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1 Equinor NO NO X X
2 Total NO FR X X
3 Aker BP NO NO X X X
4 ConocoPhillips US US X X
5 BP US UK X X
6 Exxon Mobil US US X X
7 ENI US IT X X
8 Anglo American FI UK X X
9 Repsol US ES X X
10 Royal Dutch Shell US NL X X X
11 Baffinland Iron Mines
Corporation
CA CA X X
12 Chevron CA US X X X
13 Gazprom RU RU X X
14 Arctic Slope Regional Corp. US US X X
15 MMG Resources CA AU X X
16 Arctic Gold Mining NO US X X
17 Elkem NO NO X X
18 Boliden SE SE X X
19 Novatek RU RU X X
20 NANA Regional Corporation US US X X
21 Atlantic Petroleum NO DK X X X
22 Kinross Gold RU CA X X
23 LKAB SE SE X X
24 North Energy NO NO X X X
25 Wintershall NO DE X X X
26 Alyeska Pipeline Service Company US US X X
27 Severstal RU RU X X
28 DEA Norge NO NO X X X
29 Sydvaranger Gruve NO NO X X
30 Yamal LNG RU RU X
31 Capricorn Greenland Exploration DK DK X X X
32 Achimgaz RU RU X X
33 Petoro NO NO X X
34 Imperial Oil CA CA X X
35 Agnico Eagle Mines FI CA X X
36 Norwegian Rose NO NO X X
37 Lukoil RU RU X X
38 Norilsk Nickel RU RU X X
39 Doyon US US X X
40 Leonhard Nilsen & Sonner NO NO X X
41 Hudson Resources DK CA X X
(Continues)












42 Nordic Mining NO NO X X
43 Lundin NO SE X X X
44 Yamalzoloto RU RU X X
45 Omya Hustadmarmor NO CH X X
46 OMV NO AT X X X
47 Geo Mining NO NO X X
48 Bashneft RU RU X X
49 Tullow Oil NO UK X X X
50 ENGIE NO FR X X
51 Spirit Energy NO DE X X X
52 Nussir NO NO X X
53 ALROSA RU RU X X
54 Bluejay Mining DK UK X X
55 Occidental Petroleum US US X X
56 E.ON NO DE X X X
57 Platina Resources DK AU X X
58 PGNiG NO PL X X X
59 Greenland Resources DK CA X X
60 Teck Resources US CA X X
61 Marine Arctic Geological
Expedition
RU RU X X X
62 Hilcorp US US X X
63 Fortis Petroleum Corporation NO NO X X X
64 Lime Petroleum NO NO X X X
65 Auryn Resources CA CA X X
66 Nunaoil DK DK X X X
67 Norge Mineral Resources NO CH X X
68 Kovdorsky GOK RU RU X X
69 Arctic Marine Engineering-Geol.
Expeditions
RU RU X X
70 Great Bear Petroleum US US X X
71 Centrica Resources NO UK X X X
72 Nortec Minerals FI CA X X
73 Dragon Mining FI AU X X
74 Aurion Resources FI CA X X
75 Concedo NO NO X X X
76 Rosneft RU RU X X
77 Northgas RU RU X X
78 Skaland Graphite NO NO X X
79 Sibelco Nordic NO BE X X
80 Nenetskaya Neftyanaya Komp. RU RU X X
81 Store Norske NO NO X X
82 Edison NO IT X X X
83 Noreco NO NO X X X
84 IronBark Zinc DK AU X X
85 Polymetal Int. RU CY X X
86 Commander Resources CA CA X X












87 Taranis Resources FI US X X
88 True North Gems CA CA X X
89 Tertiary Minerals FI UK X X
90 Gold Fields FI ZA X X
91 Northern Cross Energy CA CA X X
92 Vorkutaugol RU RU X X
93 PhosAgro RU RU X X
94 Brooks Range Petroleum US US X X
95 SK Rusvietpetro RU RU X X
96 Caelus Energy US US X X
97 Novourengoyskaya Burovaya
Kompaniya
RU RU X X
98 First Quantum Minerals FI CA X X
99 Magnus Minerals FI FI X X
100 RUSAL RU RU X X
101 Beowulf Mining SE UK X X
102 Vår energi NO NO X X X
103 Lovozerskiy GOK RU RU X X
104 Surgutneftegas RU RU X X
105 CNPC RU RU X X
106 Komnedra RU RU X X
107 Trust Arktikugol NO RU X X
108 TMAC Resources CA CA X X
109 The QUARTZ Corp. NO FR X X
110 Almazy Anabara RU RU X X
111 North-Western Phosphorous
Company
RU RU X X
112 EMX Royalty Corporation SE CA X X
113 Hannukainen Mining FI FI X X
114 Arktikmorneftegazrazvedka RU RU X X X
115 Sunstone Metals SE AU X X
116 Dalmorneftegeophysica RU RU X X
117 Zarubezhneft RU RU X X
118 ERIELL RU RU X X
118 Stroygazconsulting RU RU X X
118 First Ore-Mining Company RU RU X X
The three last companies are italicized because they share one rank.
Country codes: CA, Canada; DK, Denmark; FI, Finland; NO, Norway; RU, Russia; SE, Sweden; US, United States.
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APPENDIX B
Algorithm flowchart
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APPENDIX C
SSRR algorithm computer code
This is the hypertext preprocessor (PHP) open code for the automated SSRR algorithm used to process expert input data for AERI.
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Northern Shield Resources DK
Nytis Exploration CA
Spike Exploration Holding NO
* Country codes: CA, Canada; DK, Denmark; FI, Finland; NO, Norway; RU,
Russia; SE, Sweden; US, United States.
OVERLAND ET AL. 1643
